Abstract This paper provides worldwide projections of population, educational attainment, international migration and income for the twenty first century. We develop and parametrize a dynamic, stylized model of the world economy that accounts for interdependencies between socio-demographic and economic variables. Our baseline scenario is in line with the 'high-fertility' population prospects of the United Nations, assumes constant education and migration policies, long-run absolute convergence in total factor productivity (TFP) between emerging and high-income countries, and the absence of economic take-off in Africa. It predicts a rise in the income share of Asia (from 37 to 58% of the world income) and in the demographic share of Africa (from 10 to 29% of the world adult population). Over the twenty first century, the worldwide proportion of adult migrants will increase by less than 1% point (from 3.5 to 4.3%). Keeping its immigration policy unchanged, the 15 members of the European Union will see their average immigration rate increase from 7.4 to 18.2%. In Italy, the immigration pressure will increase fourfold. On the contrary, immigration rates will be fairly stable in the non-European, high-income countries. Then, we assess the This essay is a revised version of the paper prepared within the "Value Added in Motion (VAM)" project funded by the Enel Foundation. We thank Giorgio Barba Navaretti, Giovanni Facchini and Tommaso Frattini for helpful comments. Joël Machado also acknowledges financial support by the Luxembourg National Research Fund (9037210). Author's personal copy 126 F. Docquier, J. Machado sensitivity of our projections to changes in migration policies, TFP disparities, fertility and education. Large increases in the average European (and Italian) immigration rates are obtained under all the scenarios. More than ever, the management of immigration will represent a major societal challenge for European countries.
1 For example, the relationship between economic growth and environmental quality is not fixed along the development path. It changes as a country reaches a level of income at which people can demand and afford a more efficient infrastructure and a cleaner environment. This may imply an inverted-U relationship between environmental degradation and economic growth, known as the Environmental Kuznets Curve (Grossman and Krueger 1995) . Recent evidence shows however, that developing countries are addressing environmental issues, sometimes adopting developed country standards with a short time lag and sometimes performing better than some wealthy countries (Stern 2004; Dasgupta et al. 2002) . As far as terrorism is concerned, exploratory evidence in Krueger and Maleckova (2003) suggests that neither poverty nor education has a direct, causal impact on terrorism. See also Milanovic (2005) on the political consequences of income and population disparities.
of income and population disparities across countries can help us understand the forces that will govern the supply of migrants and future migration pressures over the twenty first century.
Historically, the number of international migrants has increased from 92 to 211 million between 1960 and 2010, following the level of the world population. Hence, the worldwide average migration rate has been fairly stable at around 3% of the world population. However, the proportion of foreign-born in the population of high-income OECD countries has increased from 4.6 to 10.9% over the same period, and the proportion of immigrants originating from developing countries has soared from 1.5 to 8.0% (Özden et al. 2011) , and an increasing proportion of these migrants has a higher education level (Kerr et al. 2016) . Immigration has become a major political issue in high-income countries and it is important to identify the factors that will govern its future. Over the last three decades, the take-off of China, India and other emerging countries has shaped the size and structure of migration flows, inducing a fall in the supply of migrants from these two countries to Western destinations. The evolution of the population, productivity and immigration policies in these transition economies might have drastic effects on the future of the world economy and the allocation of international migrants, especially if these countries become increasingly attractive for foreign workers. In addition, the macroeconomic and demographic prospects for subSaharan African countries are other key determinants of future migration flows. Over the past decades, the evolution of south-north migration flows has been strongly correlated with the evolution of the population size in developing countries. The migration pressure is likely to intensify as the share of the African continent in the world population is expected to increase threefold in the course of the twenty first century (United Nations 2014). This could drastically affect the countries of the European Union, the main destinations of African emigrants. The evolution of the African average income will be another key determinant of the worldwide supply of migrants.
Predicting the distributions of income, population and migration is a complex task given the strong interdependencies between these variables. These interdependencies have rarely been accounted for in projection exercises. For example, the demographic projections of the United Nations do not anticipate the economic forces and policy reforms that shape demography (see Mountford and Rapoport 2014) . They assume long-run convergence towards low fertility and high life expectancy across countries, and constant immigration flows, therefore neglecting interdependencies between fertility, mortality and migration scenarios, and their interplay with the evolution of human capital and the world distribution of income. The IIASA projections include the educational dimension (see Samir et al. 2010 ), predicting the population by level of educational attainment, and accounting for differentials in fertility, mortality and migration by education. However, assumptions about future migration development are seemingly independent on future changes in the economic and socio-demographic environment. Given the high correlation between economic and socio-demographic variables, assuming cross-country convergence in demographic indicators implicitly suggests that economic variables should also converge in the long-run. This is not what historical data reveal (see Bourguignon and Christian 2002; Sala-i-Martin 2006) . Finally, Hanson and McIntosh (2016) estimate a gravity-style empirical model of bilateral migration and feed it with projections of demographic variables and income. Their 123 approach does not account for interdependencies between population changes, migration, education decisions and income.
The general premise of this paper is that the interdependencies between economic and demographic variables play a key role in shaping future migration pressures and development inequality. We develop and parametrize a dynamic, stylized model of the world economy with endogenous income disparities, migration, fertility and education decisions. The model accounts for the links between (skill-biased) emigration prospects, investment in human capital and population growth. It distinguishes between 195 countries, populated by two types of adult workers (the college-educated and the less educated) and their offspring. Inevitably, the model omits several features of the real world. It does not account for all demographic variables (such as urbanization, mortality, network externalities, aging) and economic variables (such as trade, unemployment, redistribution, capital movements). However, it accounts for the long-run interactions between human capital accumulation, migration and growth. We believe such a quantitative framework is an appropriate tool to identify the key factors governing the future of the world economy and migration flows. We calibrate the model on the year 2000, the last year for which bilateral migration stock data by education level are available for all country pairs. Using scenarios about the evolution of total factor productivity (TFP), education, fertility and migration policies, we jointly predict the evolution of income inequality, population growth, and migration flows over the twenty first century.
Overall, our results indicate that the trajectory of the world economy is highly sensitive to the technological environment. In particular, the evolution of productivity in transition economies and in Africa will have a drastic impact on the worldwide population size, income level and inequality. If the take-off of emerging countries is accompanied by a relaxation of migration costs to these countries, this will increase the world income, reduce inequality and reduce the migration pressure in the current main destination countries. In our baseline scenarios and in line with Hanson and McIntosh (2016) , we predict that the migration pressure will intensify in the 15 countries of the European Union. Keeping immigration policies unchanged, the average immigration rates to the EU15 could increase from 7.4 to 18.2% in our baseline. In Italy, the adult immigration rate will increase fourfold (from 2.2% in 2000 to 8.5% in 2100). It is worth noticing that the Italian immigration rate already tripled between 2000 and 2010, partly due to the recent events in the Middle East and Africa. However, the migration pressures captured in this paper are generated by structural and gradual socio-demographic changes, which may be added to the recent contextual factors. Our analysis suggests that there should be further episodes of large-scale migration in Europe in general, and in Italy in particular. Changes in fertility and educational policies affect the world population and have limited macroeconomic effects; however they have drastic effects on European immigration rates. Our results show that the situation in Europe is closely connected to the demographic and economic futures of Africa. A slow and partial convergence in TFP between Africa and high-income countries or a decrease in African birth rates could alleviate the rise in European immigration by 2-4% points in the long-run. Still, a large increase in the average European immigration rate is obtained under all scenarios. More than ever, the management of immigration could become a major societal challenge for European countries.
The remainder of the paper is organized as following. Section 2 provides a nontechnical description of our model. 2 Section 3 describes its parameterization and the baseline projections for the twenty first century. The sensitivity of our projections to migration policies, technological and demographic environments is analyzed in Sect. 4. Finally, Sect. 5 concludes.
The World Economy Model
Our model covers the world economy over the period 2000-2100. It endogenizes income disparities between and within 195 countries (k = 1, . . . , 195), bilateral migration by education level, fertility and education decisions. It assumes one-period lived adult decision-makers, and countries characterized by heterogeneous levels of TFP, higher and basic education costs, and national practices in the field of child labor. The trajectory of these country-specific characteristics determines individual decisions about (basic and higher) education and migration, as well as the productive potential of nations.
Adults maximize their well-being and decide where to live, whether to invest in their own (higher or college) education, how much to consume, and how much to invest in the basic (i.e. primary and secondary) education of their children. We distinguish between college-educated adults and the less educated (s = h, l). We assume that preferences are represented by a two-level nested utility function. The outer utility function has deterministic and random components. For an individual of skill type s in cohort t, the utility moving from a country of origin k to a country of destination i is denoted by U ki,s,t and depends on four terms: an endogenous destination-specific component, v i,s,t , the effort to move from the origin to the destination country (reflecting private migration costs and the effort to obtain a visa), m ki,s,t , the effort to acquire higher education (if acquired) in the origin country, e k,s,t , and a dyadic migration taste shock reflecting heterogeneous preferences for alternative locations, ε ki,s,t . The latter two components of the outer utility function vary across individuals. The effort to acquire higher education-more exactly, the monotonic transformation of it, (1 − e k,s,t ) −1 -follows a Pareto distribution with country-specific scale parameters. As far as the migration taste shock (ε ki,s,t ) is concerned, it follows an extreme-value distribution of type 1 (EVD distribution) with a zero mode. We use the following semi-logarithmic specification:
The maximization of this outer utility function, which basically involves a comparison between alternative (discrete) higher education and migration options, determines the education structure of the adult population, the number of bilateral migrants and the number of non-migrants. The timing of decisions is as follows:
• In the first stage, new adults who received basic education in their younger years discover their education type (e k,s,t ). 
where θ and λ are preference parameters for the quantity and quality of children. After migration, adults maximize this inner utility function subject to a standard budget constraint, which includes the time cost of raising children (τ per child), the cost of providing basic education and child labor. Fertility and basic-education decisions govern population growth and the proportion of children receiving basic education.
The outer and inner utility functions are interrelated. When deciding to emigrate or stay in their home country, individuals anticipate v i,s,t , the optimal level of (inner) utility attainable in all possible destinations, as well as m ki,s,t , the effort required to emigrate. Hence, destination choices are governed by differences in income, (basic and higher) education policies, and migration costs. The sum of type-s adults deciding to live in country k is denoted by N k,s,t : their labor supply is denoted by L k,s,t = N k,s,t (1 − τ n k,s,t ) as raising one child implies a time cost τ.
The model also endogenizes income disparities between and within countries. Education and migration decisions affect the size and the structure of the labor force in all the countries. This determines production and wages. In each country, production is the product of TFP by a constant-elasticity-of-substitution (CES) combination of the low-skilled and high-skilled employment levels. We write:
where A k,t measures the TFP, φ k governs the relative productivity of college-educated workers, and ϕ is a transformation of the elasticity of substitution, σ = 1/(1 − ϕ ). The skill-specific wage rates are equal to the marginal productivity of workers. Given the CES structure in (3), changes in the composition of the labor force driven by migration or education decisions affect income levels and inequality within countries. The mechanics and timing of the model are summarized on Fig. 1 . The set of country-specific exogenous variables include the TFP levels, basic and higher education costs and the wage that can be earned by uneducated children (reflecting child labor . The latter variable affects the incentive to have children and the opportunity cost of education; it is a key determinant of the fertility rate and basic education decisions. At time t, the size of the native adult population and the proportion of adults who received basic education are pre-determined. The timing of decision is such that adults decide whether to acquire higher education or not before discovering their migration taste. At the beginning of the period, they educate if the expected benefits from college education exceed the training effort; adults who did not receive basic education have no access to higher education. It is worth noticing that the expected benefits from college education are affected by emigration prospects: if migration restrictions are skill-biased in the richest destination countries, individuals anticipate that acquiring education increases the probability to emigrate to a wealthier country. This is in line with recent literature on brain drain and brain gain (see Docquier and Rapoport 2012) . 3 This cost-benefit analysis determines the number of college-educated and less educated natives at time t. Then, natives discover their migration taste and decide to emigrate or to stay in their home country. This determines the number of collegeeducated and less educated residents at time t. Finally, after migration, each individual chooses the number of children and the proportion of them who receive basic education. The model is calibrated in such a way that college-educated adults provide each child with basic education. The structure of the resident labor force and fertility decisions determines the supply of labor in each country. In turn, this determines the equilibrium wage rates and the GDP level. In our general equilibrium framework, decisions about fertility, education, migration and the world distribution of income (i.e. wage disparities between and within countries) are interdependent.
This model is parameterized to match the characteristics of the world economy in the year 2000 and the dynamics of population over the period 1975-2000. As described below, our baseline scenario is also compatible with the 'High fertility' population projections of the United Nations for the period 2000-2100 (United Nations 2014) and the trends in TFP disparities observed between 1980 and 2010. Our baseline projections are presented in Sect. 3. Then, we simulate the trajectory of the world economy under alternative sets of technological, socio-demographic and immigration policy scenarios in Sect. 4.
Parameterization and Baseline Projections for the Twenty First Century
Most structural parameters are assumed to be identical across countries and are calibrated in line with the empirical literature (for more details, see Delogu et al. 2017 ).
The time-cost of having children is set to 15% of the parental time endowment. This means that the maximal (or biological) fertility rate equals 6.7 children per adult, or 13 per couple. The preference parameters for the quantity and quality of children in the inner utility function (2), θ and λ, are set 0.3 and 0.6, respectively. The elasticity of substitution in the production function (3) equals 3.0 in all countries, as in Docquier and Machado (2016) . In the outer utility function, the scale parameter of the distribution of the random component (ε ki,s,t ) determines the elasticity of migration to income disparities. It is set to unity in order to match the empirically estimated level of this elasticity (around 0.7, equal to 1 − θ in our model). The slope of the Pareto distribution of higher education costs determines the sensitivity of higher education decisions to the skill premium and skill-biased emigration prospects. We iterated on this parameter and set it to 0.4 in order to match the empirically estimated levels of the average elasticity of college-education investment to high-skilled emigration prospects in developing countries. The other parameters (TFP levels and policy variables, as depicted on Fig. 1 ) are assumed to be country-specific and are calibrated as explained in Sects. 3.1-3.3. Baseline simulation projections are described in Sects. 3.4-3.5.
Total Factor Productivity (TFP)
To identify the trends in TFP, we construct panel data and regress the 5-year growth rate of TFP of all countries k, log(A k,t /A k,t−5 ), on the 5-year lagged distance to the USA, log( A US,t−5 /A k,t−5 ), time fixed effects, a t , income-group and geographic dummies, X k , an indicator of lagged human capital, log(h k,t−5 ), and a constant, a 0 . Our "convergence equation" writes as following:
This equation determines the trajectory of TFP disparities across countries and is compatible with a long-run balanced-growth path. Indeed, differencing Eq. (4) with the same expression for the US yields that the distance to the US frontier is:
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If b is comprised between 0 and 1, the long-run (LR) distance to the US is given by:
We collect data on GDP per capita, the size and education structure of the labor force for all the countries of the world in 5-year intervals over the period 1980-2010. To identify the TFP level, we use the CES production technology in (3) and assume an elasticity of substitution equal to 3.0 in all the countries as in Docquier and Machado (2016) . The country-specific preference parameters for high-skilled and low-skilled workers, φ k in (3), are parameterized to match data on skill premia in 2000 from Hendricks (2004) . These parameters are assumed to be time invariant. We then identify the TFP levels of the 195 countries in 5-year intervals (denoted by A k,t ) as a residual of the production technology. As for the human capital proxy, we use the proportion of individuals aged 25 and over with tertiary education completed (Barro and Lee 2013) . We estimated (4) using 1365 observations (195 countries times 7 periods of 5 years, from 1980-85 to 2005-10). Empirical results are described in Table 1 . In columns 1 and 2 (the most parsimonious specifications), we identify a slow process of absolute convergence. The speed of convergence is around 4% per 5 year period; it is robust to the inclusion of time fixed effects. In column 3, we add income-group dummies (reference group = high-income countries) and show that (1) the constant is not significantly different from zero (i.e. absolute convergence in TFP between the US and other high-income countries); (2) the dummy for the BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India and China) is not significant, suggesting that emerging countries are also converging with high-income countries; 4 and (3) the dummy variables for middle-income and low-income countries are negative and significant. Contrary to the BRICs, the other developing countries will not catch up with high-income countries in the long-run. Adding human capital in column 5 does not improve the fit as human capital is weakly significant. In columns 5 and 6, the empirical models with geographical dummies have lower predictive power than models based on income groups. Multicollinearity issues arise when region and income group dummies are included in the same regression.
The regression in column 3 are used to define our baseline TFP scenario. It predicts that, in the very long-run, TFP levels in low-income and middle-income countries will be equal to 6.55 and 25.54% of the TFP level in the USA, respectively. Indeed, in (4), the term cX k is equal to −0.304 and −0.152 in low-income and middle-income countries respectively, b is equal to 0.111, and cX US is equal to zero. In our baseline scenario, we assume an annual TFP growth rate of 1.5% for the USA and use the estimated coefficients to predict TFP levels of all countries until the year 2100. Figure  2a depicts the trajectory of the average TFP level of each income group as percentage of the US level (A k,t /A US,t ). In the BRICs, the average TFP in 2000 amounted to 27.2% of the US level and is predicted to reach 86.9% of the US level in 2100. In high-income countries, the TFP level will increase from 73.1 to 96.5% of the US level. On the contrary, the technological distance to the US frontier will increase for middle- income and low-income countries, where the relative TFP level will decrease from 31.2 to 25.5 and from 8.9 to 6.5%, respectively. In sub-Saharan Africa, the average TFP level will decrease from 20.0 to 15.4%.
Population
The evolution of the world population is governed by the fertility and education decisions of individuals. The children's wage rates (capturing national practices in the field of child labor) affect the incentive to have children and the opportunity cost of education. For each country, we parameterize its current and future levels to match the evolution of the working-age population between 1975 and 2000, and to be in line with the 'High Fertility' population projections of the United Nations for the twenty first century. In the baseline, the world population aged 25 and over will increase from 3.2 billion to 10.5 billion between 2000 and 2100. 5 This involves an average annual growth rate of 1.2% in the world population. Nevertheless, what mainly matters in the model is the relative share of each country or region in the world population. Figure 2b depicts the evolution of the demographic share of the six main regions of the world from 2000 to 2100. In line with the United Nations demographic projections (United Nations 2014), our model predicts that the share of the African continent will drastically increase over the twenty first century, due to an average population growth rate of 2.3% per year. In 2000, Africa represented about 10% of the world adult population. According to our projections, this share will reach 29% in 2100 and Africa will account for about one third of the world population growth. The share of North America will globally remain stable. On the contrary, the shares of the other regions will decrease: from 60.9 to 49.0% in Asia, from 13.9 to 7.5% in Europe, from 7.9 to 7.1% in Latin America and the Caribbean. Still, the Asian continent will remain the largest one. As argued in Mountford and Rapoport (2014) , shocks that affect China or India or the African continent will have drastic effects on the world economy.
Educational Attainment
As far as the educational structure of the population is concerned, the country-specific parameters of the distribution of education costs are calibrated such that we match data on the skill composition of the working-age populations in 2000. Basic education costs, expressed as percentage of the country-specific wage rate of college graduates, are assumed to be time-invariant in the baseline. As far as higher education is concerned, the country-specific parameters of the Pareto distributions of education costs match the proportion of college graduates and are also assumed to be time-invariant. Hence, in the baseline, the evolution of the skill structure of the world labor force is only governed by the change in national practices in the field of child labor. Overall, we use conservative assumptions about future educational attainments. Figure 2c depicts the evolution of the proportion of college graduates in the labor force between 2000 and 2100. This share will increase from 18.8 to 27.0% in Europe. By way of comparison, it will increase from 50.6 to 55.5% in North America, and from 30.1 to 39.0% in high-income countries (not reported on the figure). Matching the trends observed between 1975 and 2000, we also predict a drastic improvement in Latin America, from 11.4 to 24.1%. In the other developing regions, this share will increase at a slow pace under our high-fertility variant (from 6.0 to 9.0% on average, not reported on the figure) . In particular, it will increase from 6.1 to 9.6% in Asia and from 4.6 to 5.7% in Africa. The bold line represents the world average, changing from 11.2 to 14.1% over the twenty first century.
Income per Worker
Changes in TFP levels and in the education structure of the labor force determine the time path of the income per worker in all the countries. In the United States, income per worker will be multiplied by 4.8 between 2000 and 2100, increasing from USD 52,102 to 250,038. Figure 3a depicts the time path of the income per worker in the other regions as percentage of the US level. The worldwide average income will converge towards the US level (from 26.1 to 45.7%, i.e. from USD 13,597 to 114,309). Convergence will be rapid in Europe (from 47.4 to 84.6%) and Asia (from 15.6 to 53.4%). The latter result is largely driven by the take-off of China and India, where the average income per worker will increase from USD 5773 to 177,826 in our baseline scenario. Convergence will be slower in Latin America (from 25.4 to 39.8%) and absent in Africa (from 11.0 to 10.7%). In the latter region, economic growth will be relatively slower than in high-income countries, due to rising TFP disparities and slow progress in educational attainment. Income per worker will only increase from USD 4096 to 18,720 in sub-Saharan Africa, and from 9382 to 41,392 in the MENA (Middle East and Northern Africa). Figure 3b gives the evolution of the regional shares in the world aggregate income. The most perceptible change is the rise of Asia. Due to the take-off of China and India, the income share of Asia will rise from 37.3 to 57.9% over the twenty first century. The increasing share of Africa in the world population will slightly increase its share in the world income from 4.3 to 6.9%. The share of the other regions will decrease over time: from 7.7 to 6.1% in Latin America, from 25.1 to 13.8% in Europe, from 23.7 to 13.7% in North America, and from 1.9 to 1.5% in the mainland of Australia.
International Migration
Migration costs in 2000 (m ki,s,2000 ) are parameterized so as to match the observed size and structure of each migration corridor in the year 2000, as documented in Artuç et al. (2015) . They are treated as time-invariant over the period 2000-2100. Hence, future migration flows respond to changing income and population disparities, keeping migration policies and other barriers unchanged. Table 2 gives the rate or emigration of college-educated adults as percentage of the college-educated native population aged 25 and over. Similar emigration patterns 123 Fig. 3 Income projections are obtained for the less educated, although their emigration rates are smaller. The worldwide average emigration rate of college graduates will increase from 8.1 to 9.2% over the twenty first century. Slight increases are predicted for the US, and the rest of Asia. Slight decreases are obtained in Canada and Australia, the 15 countries of the European Union, the Latin American countries and Persian Gulf countries. This is due to the fact that TFP in the latter countries will catch up with the US level. Due to income divergence, the two regions where the brain drain will drastically intensify over the twenty first century are sub-Saharan Africa and the MENA. In the MENA, the emigration rate of college-educated workers will increase from 17.4 to 20.8%. In sub-Saharan Africa, the rise is even greater, from 15.6 to 20.7%. Europe is the main destination of the new emigrants from these two regions. Unsurprisingly, as explained below, the absence of economic take-off in the MENA and sub-Saharan Africa will affect the migration pressure to Europe. Table 3 presents the immigration prospects for the world and for selected receiving countries. Assuming unchanged immigration policies, the worldwide average propor- tion of adult migrants will increase from 3.5 to 4.3% over the twenty first century. A slight increase in immigration rates will be observed in Japan and Switzerland, at least in the first half of the century. The United States, Canada and Australia will see their immigration rates slightly decrease in the long-run. On the contrary, European and emerging countries will experience drastic changes in their immigration rates. In the EU15, the immigration rate in 2100 will be 2.4 times larger than in 2000. This is due to the combination of two factors. On the demand side, Europe will gradually become more attractive, due to the convergence in TFP and income with the United States. On the supply side, the EU15 is the main destination of African emigrants. Rising income disparities between Europe and sub-Saharan Africa or MENA will increase the migration pressure to Europe. Migration pressures to Italy increase more than in the other European countries; the Italian immigration rate will increase fourfold over the twenty first century. Remember the model is parameterized on the year 2000, a year at which the adult immigration rate of Italy was small (2.2%). 6 The Italian immigration rate increased threefold between 2000 and 2010, and the important proximate causes of this change are the conflict and political unrest in the Middle East and Africa. The migration pressures captured in this paper are due to structural and gradual socio-demographic changes, which may be added to the current contextual factors.
Our analysis suggests that there should be further episodes of large-scale migration in the coming decades. Under constant immigration policies, the long-run immigration rate of Italy could reach or exceed 25%. At the global level, the proportion of international migrants will increase from 3.5 to 4.3%. The EU15 will represent about 5% of the world population in 2100. Hence, a 10%-point change in the European immigration rate alone explains a 0.5%-point change in the world proportion of migrants. In the BRICs, the average immigration rate will double (from 1.0 to 1.9%). A 0.9%-point change in immigration seems a small number for a destination country. However, the BRICs will represent about one third of the population in 2100. Increased immigration to the BRICs alone explains a 0.3%-point increase in the world proportion of migrants.
Sensitivity to Economic, Demographic and Policy Environments
The main conclusions from our baseline experiment are that the economic weight of the BRICs (from 22.2 to 51.2% of the world income) and demographic weight of Africa (from 10.2 to 29.4% of the world population) will drastically increase over the twenty first century. This will translate into greater migration pressures to the European Union. Economic and demographic shocks that affect the BRICs and Africa are likely to have drastic implications for the world economy and the structure of international migration. In this section, we simulate the trajectory of the world economy under six alternative scenarios about the evolution of TFP levels, fertility, education, and migration policies. Figures 4, 5 and 6 show the deviations from the baseline and Table 
Technological Variants
As shown on Fig. 2a , our baseline scenario assumes that the average TFP level of the BRICs will increase from 27.2 to 86.9% of the US level, and the average TFP level of sub-Saharan African countries will decrease from 20.0 to 15.4% of the US level. We consider two alternative technological scenarios:
-The first variant, labeled as 'Slower BRIC', assumes a slower convergence for the BRICs. In (4), we set the fixed effect for the BRICs to X BRIC = −0.075, rather than zero in Table 1 . This level is roughly equivalent (in absolute value) to half of the fixed effect of other middle-income countries (equal to −0.152). Under this scenario, the BRICs will not catch up with high-income countries: the average TFP of the BRICs will increase from 27.2 to 47.1% of the US level between 2000 and 2100 (rather than 86.9% in the baseline). -The second variant, labeled 'Faster SSA', assumes a faster convergence for subSaharan African countries. In (4), we set the fixed effect for the SSA countries to X SSA = −0.225, rather than −0.303 in the baseline. This represents a 0.075 shock in X SSA , equivalent in size to the BRIC's drop in TFP considered in the first variant. Hence, while diverging in the baseline, the relative TFP level of sub-Saharan countries will partly converge towards the US level: the average TFP of African countries will increase from 20.0 to 28.4% of the US level between 2000 and 2100 (rather than 15.4% in the baseline).
Although changes in TFP affect high-skilled and low-skilled wages, we assume that the income that can be earned by uneducated children is kept at its baseline level. Hence, TFP changes affect the relative wage of children and optimal fertility decisions. These two technological variants are as plausible as the baseline one. Figure 4 shows that future TFP changes will drastically modify the economic and demographic trajectory of the world economy. Figure 4a represents the trajectory of the world adult population over the twenty first century, in perspective with historical data for the nineteenth and twentieth centuries from the United Nations database. Figure 4b gives the percentage of deviation from the baseline over the twenty first century. Under the 'Slower BRIC' scenario, the wage rate (i.e. the opportunity cost of having children) increases less in emerging countries. 7 Compared to the baseline, the fertility rate is greater and by 2100, the world population will be 49.3% larger than under the baseline and will reach 15.7 billion (instead of 10.5 billion under the baseline). This population size is above the United Nations prediction with constant fertility. On the contrary, under the 'Faster SSA' scenario, fertility decreases in Africa and the world population will be 12.3% smaller in 2100 (9.2 billion instead of 10.5 under the baseline). This population trajectory is similar to the United Nations projections under the 'Medium Fertility' variant. Figure 4c represents the trajectory of the worldwide average level of income per worker in the twenty first century, in perspective with historical data for the nineteenth and twentieth centuries from Maddison (2007) . Figure 4d gives the percentage of deviation from the baseline. Under the 'Slower BRIC' scenario, the worldwide average level of income per worker in 2100 will be 29.4% smaller than under the baseline (USD 80,748 instead of 114,309). The average level of income per worker in China and India will decrease from USD 177,826 in the baseline to USD 80,499 (i.e. −54.7%). On the contrary, under the 'Faster SSA' scenario, the worldwide level of income per worker will be 12.6% greater (USD 128, 672 instead of 114, 309) . By 2100, the average level of income per worker in sub-Saharan Africa will increase from USD 18,720 in the baseline to USD 41,008 (i.e. +119.1%). Figure 4e represents the trajectory of the world migration rate in the twenty first century, in perspective with historical data for the twentieth centuries from McKeown (2004) . Figure 4f gives the worldwide stock of adult migrants as percentage of deviation from the baseline. Under the 'Slower BRIC' scenario, the worldwide stock of migrants will be slightly smaller than under the baseline from 2000 to 2050, and slightly greater after 2050. This results from two forces: the BRICs will be less attractive for international migrants, and will send more emigrants abroad. Given the rise in the world population, the world migration rate will be smaller than in the baseline. However, Table 4 shows that the long-run immigration rates of the US, United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and the Persian Gulf countries are between 0.8 and 1.8% points greater under this variant. Under the 'Faster SSA' scenario, the world migration stock will be 13.4% smaller than under the baseline. In the long-run, the brain drain from sub-Saharan Africa will be 5.2% points smaller than under the baseline (15.5% rather than 20.7%). The implications for European countries are important: by 2100, faster TFP growth in Africa will reduce the European immigration rate from 18.2 to 16.5%. Table 4 shows that the faster growth in Africa reduces the long-run immigration rate of European countries in general (between 1 and 2% points), and of the United Kingdom in particular (by 6.2% points). TFP growth in Africa is a key determinant of the migration pressure to Europe. As far as the world migration rate is concerned, it will remain comparable to the baseline level.
Finally, Fig. 4g represents the trajectory of the Theil index of income inequality in the twenty first century, in perspective with historical data for the nineteenth and twentieth centuries from Bourguignon and Christian (2002), complemented by Salai-Martin (2006) for the period 1980-2000. Figure 4h gives the evolution of the Theil index as percentage of deviation from the baseline. Under the 'Slower BRIC' scenario, the Theil index will be higher than under the baseline until 2050 but becomes lower thereafter (18.3% smaller by 2100). Under the 'Faster SSA' scenario, it will decrease rapidly and will be 22.9% smaller by 2100.
These results illustrate the strong interdependencies between the evolution of the world economy, income inequality and demographic changes, as well the strong sensitivity of population and economic projections to the technological environment. Helping emerging countries to converge slightly reduces the migration pressure; helping African countries to take off economically and limit its population growth rates has a drastic impact on the European immigration rates.
Fertility and Educational Variants
In our baseline scenario, the world population aged 25 and over will increase from 3.2 billion to 10.5 billion (as in the 'High Fertility' variant of the United Nations population prospects) and the share of college graduates will increase from 11.2 to 14.1% between 2000 and 2100. Two alternative socio-demographic scenarios are considered here: -The first variant, labeled as 'Lower Fert', assumes smaller birth rates in all the countries of the world. Compared to the baseline, we divide children's potential income by 1.2 (i.e. we decrease it by 16.7%) in all the countries from 2025 on. This reduces the opportunity cost of basic education and the fertility rate. The effect is mainly perceptible in poor countries where child labor is severe. -The second variant, labeled as 'Higher Educ', assumes greater educational attainment in all the countries of the world. Compared to the baseline, we divide the cost of basic education by 1.5 (i.e. it decreases by 33.3%) in all the countries from 2025 on. This gradually increases the investment in basic education by low-skilled parents and the pool of adults eligible for higher education.
The demographic and macroeconomic implications of these two shocks are depicted on Fig. 5 . The scales of the axes and the baseline levels are identical to those of Fig.  4 . In the 'Lower Fert' scenario, the world population aged 25 and over will reach 7.8 billion in 2100. This is 26.5% smaller than in the baseline (10.5 billion), and corresponds to the central variant of the United Nations projections. Compared to our baseline, the annual population growth rate will decrease by 0.6% point in the MENA, 0.5% point in sub-Saharan Africa, 0.3% point and Latin America, and 0.1% point in Europe. Due to the quality-quantity tradeoff, investment in human capital is larger and by 2100, the proportion of college-graduates in the labor force will be 1.8% points greater than under the baseline. However, compared to the technological variants, the macroeconomic effects of the fertility variant are smaller. The worldwide average level of GDP per worker will be 13.8% greater and the Theil index will be 14.0% smaller in the long-run. As far as migration is concerned, the number of international migrants will be 29.9% lower. At the same time, the world population decreases by 26.5%. The worldwide average migration rate will be slightly smaller than in the baseline. The only noticeable change is that the immigration rate to high-income countries will be smaller, as shown in Table 4 . In the US and Europe, the long-run immigration rates will be 2-4% point smaller compared to the baseline (from 11.9 to 10.0 for the US, and from 18.2 to 14.3 in Europe). Population growth in Africa is a key determinant of the migration pressure to Europe. The 'Higher Educ' variant has similar effects on the proportion of college graduates in the world labor force. By 2100, this proportion will be 1.8% points greater than under the baseline. However, the macroeconomic and demographic effects are usually smaller than those of the fertility variant. In the long-run, the world population will be 4.8% greater (11 billion rather than 10.5 in the baseline). The worldwide average level of GDP per worker will be 4.3% greater and the Theil index will be 4.7% smaller. College-educated workers are more mobile than the less educated. Compared to the baseline, the rise in educational attainment increases the number of international migrants by 6.9% and the world migration rate by 0.3% points.
Migration Policy Variants
Our baseline scenario assumes constant migration costs, i.e. constant moving costs and migration policies in the main destination countries. Two alternative migration scenarios are considered here: -The first one, labeled as 'Restrict USA', assumes greater immigration restrictions in the United States. Numerically, we divide the identified values for (1−m kUS,s,t ) by four for all origin countries. -The second one, labeled as 'Open CHIND', assumes that the costs of migrating to China and India fall. Numerically, we replace the identified values for (1 − m ki,s,t ) for i = China and India by 0.2 for college graduates from Asian countries and 0.04 for less educated workers from Asian Countries (i.e. k = Asia). For the other countries, we use (1 − m kUS,s,t ), i.e. China and India become as accessible as the United States in the baseline scenario, except for migrants from Latin America who face the same costs as in the baseline. Hence, the two countries become relatively more attractive destinations, in particular for workers from Asia.
The demographic and macroeconomic implications of these two shocks are depicted on Fig. 6 . The scales of the axes and the baseline levels are identical to those of Fig. 4 .
Changes in immigration policies have a limited impact on the world population. In the 'Restrict USA' scenario, the long-run immigration rate of the US will fall from 11.9 to 5.3%. The world stock of migrants will decrease by 9.3% and the worldwide average migration rate will be 0.4% point lower than in the baseline in the long-run. Lower emigration prospects will slightly reduce investments in education and income per worker in developing regions. In addition, as potential migrants are forced to stay put, the worldwide average level of GDP per capita will be 2.8% smaller than under the baseline. Overall, increasing immigration restrictions to the US has a limited impact on the world economy and the level of inequality. It has minor effects on the migration pressure to Europe and to other industrialized countries (see Table 4 ). On the contrary, if China and India become as attractive as the richest countries of the world, the effect on the world economy will be drastic. Under the 'Open CHIND' scenario, the long-run immigration rates of China and India increase by 9.1 and 3.2% points, respectively. On the contrary, migration rates to other high-income countries decrease, as shown in Table 4 . Overall, the number of international migrants will be about 43.1% greater in the long-run. The worldwide level of GDP per worker will be 11.1% greater, as many new migrants from Asian countries increase their income by moving to China and India. Globally, increased migration to China and India can decrease the global level of inequality by about 11.6% in the long-run. Changes in the attractiveness of these two countries have important effects on the migration pressure to Europe and to other industrialized countries: if these countries open their borders to immigration, the immigration rate of the US and Europe could decrease by almost 1% point.
Conclusion
This paper highlights the strong interdependencies between the evolution of the world economy, income inequality and demographic changes. Relying on a dynamic, stylized model of the world economy with endogenous income disparities, migration, fertility and education decisions, we assess the sensitivity of population and economic projections to the technological, socio-demographic and policy environments. In all scenarios, we predict that there will be episodes of large-scale migration to Europe in the coming decades. Specifically the underlying root causes of increased migration (demographic imbalances, economic inequality, increased globalization, etc.) are all projected to exert a strong influence in the future. We predict that immigration rates will increase in the 15 countries of the European Union in general, and in Italy in particular. This is due to the fact that Europe is the main destination of African migrants and, in all likelihood, the demographic share of Africa and the income gap between Africa and high-income countries will drastically increase over the twenty first century. However, the magnitude of the effects vary across scenarios. The evolution of productivity in emerging economies and in Africa will have a drastic impact on the worldwide level of population, income disparities and the migration pressure to high-income countries. This is particularly true if technological convergence is accompanied by a fall in immigration restrictions in emerging countries. Changes in fertility policies and educational attainment have more limited macroeconomic effects but drastically affect migration rates. In face of the increasing migration pressures, cooperation with countries of origin and countries of transit might be helpful. Cooperation instruments have proliferated over the last ten years in this field. In particular, actions undertaken under the EU Migration Compacts can take various forms (e.g., use of incentives or sanctions; measures to limit/control migration, to enforce readmissions, to tighten border control, to promote development and employment; interventions in countries of origin vs transit, etc.). Our analysis shows that helping African countries to take off or to control their birth rates could alleviate the rise in the migration pressure to Europe.
